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SUMMARY
We systematically reviewed the current understanding of human population immunity against
SARS-CoV in diﬀerent groups, settings and geography. Our meta-analysis, which included all
identiﬁed studies except those on wild animal handlers, yielded an overall seroprevalence of
0.10% [95% conﬁdence interval (CI) 0.02–0.18]. Health-care workers and others who had close
contact with SARS patients had a slightly higher degree of seroconversion (0.23%, 95% CI
0.02–0.45) compared to healthy blood donors, others from the general community or non-SARS
patients recruited from the health-care setting (0.16%, 95% CI 0–0.37). When analysed by the two
broad classes of testing procedures, it is clear that serial conﬁrmatory test protocols resulted in a
much lower estimate (0.050%, 95% CI 0–0.15) than single test protocols (0.20%, 95% CI
0.06–0.34). Potential epidemiological and laboratory pitfalls are also discussed as they may
give rise to false or inconsistent results in measuring the seroprevalence of IgG antibodies
to SARS-CoV.
INTRODUCTION
Major outstanding questions about severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS) remain in order to com-
plete the agent–vector–host epidemiological triangle
(Fig. 1). Is there a signiﬁcant human reservoir of
SARS-coronavirus (CoV) from either the 2003 epi-
demic or perhaps through previous but undetected
circulation of the virus? Were there a limited number
of susceptibles within the population before the
outbreak that made community infection control
easier to achieve [1]?
Studies based on hospitalized cases have suggested
that the overall transmissibility of SARS is relatively
low compared to other pathogens, as indicated by the
basic reproductive number of y3 [2]. However, such
studies could not take into account possible episodes
of mild or moderate illness which did not require in-
patient medical care and, therefore, could not address
whether subclinical community spread played an im-
portant role in the 2003 epidemic. If this is the case,
the population might now have developed suﬃcient
herd immunity to protect against another large out-
break. Key to understanding these issues is the
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CoV in diﬀerent population groups.
Epidemiologicalandlaboratorymethodsforthestudyof
seroprevalence
The study of population immunity and prevalence of
past infection is typically based on systematic random
sampling from the general population with appropri-
ate stratiﬁcation, or on diﬀerent groups with a priori
varying degrees of risk for infection.
Systematic adherence to the basic epidemiological
principles of unbiased, random sampling is import-
ant. The sampling frame and size must be deﬁned
clearly and in the case of special surveys the response
and participation rate is also important. Together,
these components determine the validity and pre-
cision of the estimates of seroprevalence ratios. The
numerator of the ratio includes those who test posi-
tive based on a series of pre-deﬁned immunological
tests, each with a particular threshold of serological
titre to immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibodies against
the agent under consideration, indicating the number
of people in the sample who had been infected at some
stage of their life. Because SARS is a newly emergent
human disease, this also represents the extent of
asymptomatic spread since the ﬁrst reported human
case in November 2002 in Guangdong [3]. The
appropriate laboratory tests for serological diagnosis
vary depending on the agent. Moreover, the sequence
of diﬀerent tests is important as it changes the
Bayesian pre-test probability of a positive result and
thus, the overall sensitivity and speciﬁcity of the
particular testing protocol. Serial testing, where
only positive samples on the initial test proceed to
the next test, generally increases speciﬁcity but
decreases sensitivity, while parallel testing where dif-
ferent tests are performed simultaneously has the op-
positeeﬀect.ForSARS-CoV,themostwidelyadopted
methods for detection of antibodies are indirect
immunoﬂuorescence assays (IFA) and enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assays (ELISA) with cell-culture ex-
tracts from which positive screens are conﬁrmed using
standard virological neutralization tests [4]. Alterna-
tive approaches have been suggested such as ELISA-
based antibody detection tests using recombinant
antigens with positive screens conﬁrmed by Western
blots that use two diﬀerent antigenic proteins (nucleo-
capsid protein and spike polypeptide) of SARS-CoV
[5].Itisdiﬃcult,especiallyfornewlyemergingdiseases
such as SARS, to decide initially which set of labora-
tory techniques are optimal for antibody serosurveys.
A careful comparison of these diﬀerent methods
against established gold standards is essential, using
benchmark indices including sensitivity, speciﬁcity,
the area under the receiver operating characteristic
curve and likelihood ratios [6]. In addition, cross-
reactivity of these assays to related microbial agents
must be considered in order to achieve speciﬁcity and
reduce false positives to a minimum.
Serosurveys for SARS-CoV IgG antibodies
To identify relevant serosurveys for SARS-CoV anti-
bodies, we searched MEDLINE for articles published
between January 2003 and July 2004 using combi-
nationsoftheMeSHterms‘SARSvirus’,‘severeacute
respiratory syndrome’, ‘seroepidemiologic studies’
and/or ‘antibodies’, and keywords ‘serosurvey’ and/
or ‘seroprevalence’. We also searched relevant pub-
lications and websites of the World Health Organ-
ization (WHO), US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and other similar national or
regional agencies of SARS-aﬀected places to identify
studies that were potentially not included in MEDLINE.
We searched the bibliographies of identiﬁed studies
manually and consulted with experts in the ﬁeld to try
and locate other reports not found through our main
search strategy.
Our inclusion criteria were broad and required only
reporting of seroprevalence (i.e. both numerator and
denominator data) of SARS-CoV in individuals who
were never diagnosed with SARS as deﬁned by the
WHO [7]. We did not place any limits on epidemio-
logical study design, laboratory methods or language
of publication. Data were abstracted from the original
source publication by two independent, blinded re-
search assistants. Potential disagreements were settled
by a third researcher after independent review.
A total of 16 studies, from ﬁve SARS-aﬀected
regions (Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Singapore
Host
Human and
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reservoir(s) ?
Agent Vector
Fig. 1. Agent–vector–host triangle of infectious diseases.
212 G. M. Leung and othersand Toronto), were identiﬁed [4, 5, 8–21] (Table)
There is wide variation in the reported seroprevalence
of antibodies against SARS-CoV which is strongly
associated with the characteristics of the subjects
tested (indicating a priori risk of infection) and the
laboratory methods employed to determine sero-
conversion.
With the exception of handlers of wild animals and
market workers, the degree of asymptomatic infection
was <3% for all studies (Table). We combined the
results of these studies, stratiﬁed by subgroups in-
dicating the a priori risk of infection with the timing of
specimen collection classiﬁed as pre- vs. post-SARS
epidemic (Fig. 2), and by laboratory testing protocols
(Fig. 3). The 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) for the
seroprevalence estimates in each study were computed
using exact binomial CIs. The META program [22] was
employed to calculate weighting associated with in-
dividual studies. In calculating the standard errors, if
a study had no seropositive cases (i.e. a zero numer-
ator), a count value of 0.1 was used instead according
to the usual convention, to avoid the problem of zero-
count cells while minimizing the potential to inﬂate
precision of the underlying study. The method of
DerSimonian & Laird [23] was used to test for het-
erogeneity across studies which was signiﬁcant
(P<0.001) for both sets of meta-analyses presented in
Figures 2 and 3. Therefore, a random-eﬀects model
was assumed in computing the weights of the study
and variances of the combined estimates. The 95%
CIs for the combined estimates were calculated by
normal approximation.
Our meta-analysis, which included all identiﬁed
studies except those on handlers of wild animals due
to the presumed zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV and
the very diﬀerent associated risk of infection (Fig. 3),
yielded an overall seroprevalence of 0.10% (95% CI
0.02–0.18). Figure 2 shows that the summary ser-
oprevalence estimates of the diﬀerent strata follow the
same gradient of a priori risk levels, the one exception
being a study of stored serum from healthy Hong
Kong adults in 2001 [21]. The two Chinese studies [8,
19] in the wild animal markets of Guangzhou
indicated that 14.86% (95% CI 12.77–16.94) of the
workers had prior exposure to SARS-CoV although
none had apparently shown signiﬁcant symptoms
compatible with the clinical description of SARS.
Health-care workers and others who had close con-
tact with SARS patients generally had a slightly
higher degree of seroconversion (0.23%, 95% CI
0.02–0.45) compared to healthy blood donors, others
from the general community or non-SARS patients
recruited from the health-care setting (0.16%, 95%
CI 0–0.37). The two studies on stored serum collected
prior to the 2003 epidemic [5, 21] gave very diﬀerent
estimates although we note that the latter actually
tested against both human and animal SARS-CoV
strains. When analysed by the two broad classes of
testing procedures, it is clear that serial conﬁrmatory
test protocols resulted in a much lower estimate
(0.050%, 95% CI 0–0.15) than single test protocols
(0.20%, 95% CI 0.06–0.34).
Although there are considerable variations in the
seropositive estimates reported, it is clear that ser-
oconversion is extremely rare among health-care
workers, close contacts of SARS patients who did not
develop the disease and members of the general
population, including healthy individuals and non-
SARS patients. This property of SARS-CoV, perhaps
reﬂecting the evolutionary ﬁtness of the virus, is in
stark contrast to other common respiratory agents,
most notably inﬂuenza where the usual ‘iceberg’
concept of disease applies [24]. Instead the pattern of
SARS infection in the community can paradoxically
be represented as an inverted iceberg (Fig. 4).
The extent of seroconversion in asymptomatic in-
dividuals with a history of intense exposure to those
infected with SARS, including health-care workers
and close contacts of cases, should provide the upper
seropositivity limit in the general population. The
overall ﬁnding of the near absence of transmission
resulting in asymptomatic infection and seroconver-
sion in these high-risk groups from diﬀerent countries
and settings indicates that the prevailing SARS-CoV
strains almost always led to clinically apparent dis-
ease. Whereas some SARS patients might have been
initially admitted in order to reduce transmission to
family members, virtually all (perhaps with some ex-
ceptions in children) [25] had severe disease requiring
in-patient treatment, so we can infer that the 2003
epidemic infection with SARS-CoV inevitably caused
severe disease requiring hospitalization.
While the results of this meta-analysis suggest that
SARS-CoV was a new virus in humans with neither a
close precursor nor an antigenically related virus that
would have induced at least a small degree of cross-
reactivity on serological testing, the study by Zheng
and colleagues [21] on the stored serum of 938 healthy
Hong Kong adults from a hepatitis B serosurvey in
2001 detected a positive antibody response against
human SARS-CoV or animal SARS-CoV-like virus
in 1.81% (95% CI 1.06–2.89) of the sample by IFA
Seroprevalence of IgG antibodies to SARS-coronavirus 213Table. Serosurveys for SARS-CoV antibodies
Study Location Laboratory methods
Time of specimen
collection Subjects
Seroprevalence
(95% exact binomial
conﬁdence interval)
CDC [8] Guangzhou,
China
ELISA May 2003 508 wild animal traders 12.99% (10.19–16.23)
137 hospital workers 2.92% (0.80–7.31)
63 public health oﬃcials 1.59% (0.04–8.53)
84 adults recruited from a clinic 1.19% (0.03–6.46)
Chan et al.
[9]
Hong Kong IFA March–May 2003 674 health-care workers in a
tertiary care hospital that
admitted SARS patients
0%(0–0.44)
Chan et al.
[10]
Hong Kong Screened by ELISA; conﬁrmed
by IFA and Western blot
2003 (post-SARS epidemic) 12020 volunteers from the
general population
0.0083% (0.00021–0.046)
Chow et al.
[11]
Singapore Screened by ELISA; conﬁrmed
by neutralization tests
2003 (post-SARS epidemic) 84 asymptomatic health-care
workers at a tertiary care hospital
that admitted SARS patients
0% (0–3.50)
Gold et al.
[12]
Toronto,
Canada
Screened by IFA; conﬁrmed
by Western blot and
neutralization tests
July–September 2003 767 asymptomatic health-care
workers at four hospitals that
admitted SARS patients
1.04% (0.45–2.04)
Ho et al. [13] Singapore Screened by ELISA and dot-blot
immunoassay; conﬁrmed by
IFA and neutralization tests
2003 (paired serum samples
collected during the peak of
the local epidemic and on
average 31 days later)
304 asymptomatic health-care
workers at a tertiary care hospital
that admitted SARS patients*
0%(0–0.98)
Leung et al.
[4]
Hong Kong Screened by ELISA; conﬁrmed
by IFA and neutralization tests
October–December 2003 1068 close contacts of SARS
cases
0.19% (0.02–0.67)
Li et al. [14] Guangzhou,
China
ELISA 2003 (post-SARS epidemic) 103 contacts of SARS cases 0% (0–2.87)
Li et al. [15] Guangzhou,
China
IFA and ELISA 2003 (post-SARS epidemic) 1060 healthy children 0% (0–0.28)
Liu et al. [16] Beijing,
China
ELISA 2003 (post-SARS epidemic) 197 non-SARS hospital
outpatients and in-patients
f14 years
2.03% (0.56–5.12)
156 healthy primary school children 1.92% (0.40–5.52)
453 non-SARS hospital
outpatients and in-patients
o18 years
0.22% (0.01–1.22)
502 adult blood donors 0.20% (0.01–1.10)
Seto et al.
[17]
Hong Kong Screened by ELISA; conﬁrmed
by neutralization tests
2003 (post-SARS epidemic) 875 health-care workers 0.11% (0.0029–0.64)
Wang et al.
[18]
Beijing,
China
ELISA 2003 (post-SARS epidemic) 1127 health-care workers 2.57% (1.73–3.67)
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sand was conﬁrmed using neutralization tests. The re-
searchers speculated that the virus that aﬀected these
healthy seropositive individuals was antigenically
closer to the isolated animal SARS-CoV-like virus
[26] than human SARS-CoV, and that this might
account for the asymptomatic presentation of the
infected individuals who seroconverted if the early
animal strains of SARS-CoV-like virus were of low
pathogenicity to humans. Some suggest that zoonotic
transmission from animal to human was likely to be
infrequent especially given the absence of markets
of wild animals and restaurants in Hong Kong.
Therefore, there was little opportunity for evolution-
ary selective pressures to facilitate interspecies infec-
tion of the human host in Hong Kong. Moreover, the
acquisition by the virus of characteristics that enhance
virulence in humans was likely to be immature.
Human-to-human spread was probably highly in-
eﬃcient as the virus might not have adapted in its
new host. Together, these reasons were postulated to
explain why only a few persons became infected and
why they were likely to have been asymptomatic
2 years before the 2003 epidemic.
However, we hesitate in subscribing to this line of
reasoning. First, it is important to clarify that this
hypothesis is diﬀerent to the presumed asymptomatic
infection observed in Guangdong animal traders,
especially in those who handled masked palm civets
with an overall seropositivity rate of 72.7% (95% CI
49.8–89.3) [8]. Frequent zoonotic challenges in this
group probably gave rise to the high asymptomatic
seroconversion rate at a time when the SARS-CoV
animal strains had not yet evolved into a highly
pathogenic variant. Over time, sustained human ex-
posure to the presumed animal reservoir(s) of SARS-
CoV in wild animal farms and markets of southern
China eventually resulted in multiple introductions of
a moderately transmissible [2, 27] form of the virus
into the human population [3, 28, 29] that led to the
massive global outbreak. Second, it would be helpful
to know how the antibody responses in 17 out of 938
subjects who seroconverted [21] were apportioned
between human vs. animal SARS-CoV strains re-
spectively. Third, and most importantly, if animal-to-
human transmission was present in 2001 that led to a
1 in 55 chance of being asymptomatically infected in
the general population, why has this observation not
been repeated in other serosurveys since? We suggest
that this outlier seroprevalence estimate will remain
unexplained until the study is replicated on other
stored blood samples in Hong Kong and elsewhere.
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Fig. 2. Forest plots of seroprevalence estimates stratiﬁed by a priori risk of infection under a random-eﬀects model. The seroprevalence for individual studies is shown as solid
squares scaled according to weighting by using the inverse variance method. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. The combined seroprevlence estimates are shown as diamonds that
span the 95% CI (* truncated at zero).
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Fig. 3. Forest plots of seroprevalence estimates (excluding wild animal handlers) stratiﬁed by laboratory test strategies under a random-eﬀects model. The seroprevalence for
individual studies is shown as solid squares scaled according to weighting by using the inverse variance method. Error bars indicate 95 % CIs. The combined seroprevalence
estimates are shown as diamonds that span the 95 % CI (* truncated at zero).
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1
7In addition, there remains much uncertainty as to
why two surveys by Woo and colleagues [5] and Gold
et al. [12] produced much higher seroprevalence esti-
mates than other studies that also adopted a serial
conﬁrmatory testing procedure. We believe that the
diﬀerence can still be due to false positivity on lab-
oratory testing given the test kit validation procedure
adopted by Woo et al. [5] although there is insuﬃcient
detail in Gold et al.’s abstract to further appraise the
laboratory analysis. In evaluating ELISA for the de-
tectionofantibodytonucleocapsidprotein,Wooetal.
reported a sensitivity of 94.3% and a speciﬁcity of
95.3% for IgG antibody by testing specimens from
149 healthy blood donors and 106 SARS patients.
Basedonsubjectingthesevensamplesoutof149which
gave positive ELISA results to Western-blot testing,
they concluded that the speciﬁcity of the IgG antibody
test was 100%. No other description or information,
however, was provided onhow the Western-blot assay
was evaluated. A larger size of samples from another
appropriate source, including potentially interfering
samples, would be necessary to conﬁrm the speciﬁcity
of diagnostic assays. Even with a serial testing algor-
ithm, a small change in speciﬁcity may aﬀect the
positive predictive value to a great extent, especially
when the prevalence of infection here is so low.
Pitfalls, caveats and lessons learned
The ﬁrst lesson to be drawn concerns sampling
methods. With the exception of two studies [4, 10],
none of the other serosurveys fully speciﬁed the sam-
pling frame, recruitment strategy or response rate.
There was also scant attention paid to examining the
representativeness of sampled subjects [30].
The second lesson concerns the issue of survival in
health-care workers and close contacts. Both groups
were clearly exposed, whether protected or not, to a
signiﬁcant infectious source, either through direct
contact with SARS patients for whom they cared or
with whom they lived in the same household, or via a
common environmental point source such as the
sewage pipes and bathroom ventilation system in the
case of Amoy Gardens in Hong Kong [31]. The fact
that they remained asymptomatic or uninfected per-
haps implies a systematically diﬀerent host biology to
those who fell sick with the disease. Whether such
potential human leukocyte antigen (HLA) allelic dif-
ferences, that have been suggested to be diﬀerentially
associated with the clinical severity of SARS, also
extend to susceptibility and more speciﬁcally to
asymptomatic infection has yet been resolved [32]. It
would not be surprising if this were the case given
previous experience where HLA variations were
associated with susceptibility or resistance to malaria,
tuberculosis, leprosy, HIV, hepatitis virus persistence
and human coronavirus OC-43 infection [33–35]. In
this case, the seroprevalence estimates as reported
would have been biased either upwards or downwards
depending on the eﬀect of the particular HLA poly-
morphisms.
The third lesson concerns laboratory methods
including the use of serial testing procedures and con-
ﬁrmation of screening test results. Our ﬁndings indi-
cate that seroprevalence estimates tended to be
considerably higher in studies that used only single
test protocols compared to those that applied a series
of conﬁrmatory tests subsequent to a positive screen.
Speciﬁcities for the ELISA test against SARS-CoV
have been reported to be between 94.3% and 98.5%
[4, 36, 37] whereas sensitivities achieved 100% at least
1 month since the acute onset of illness [4, 27]. Given
the very low absolute levels of seroprevalence to be
detected (i.e. <3% as in the Table), a false-positive
ratio of between 1.5% and 5.7% introduces an
unacceptably high level of uncertainty in the point
estimate.
A related fourth lesson concerns the potential
for cross-reactivity between SARS-CoV and other
coronaviruses, including the four known human coro-
naviruses, i.e. OC-229E and OC-43 that cause the
common cold and the newly discovered NL63 [38]
and HKU1 [39]. NL63 is a group 1 human corona-
virus and has been isolated from children and adults
with respiratory tract infections as well as immuno-
compromised adults [40], leading some to propose
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218 G. M. Leung and othersthat it is a ‘global and seasonal pathogen of both
children and adults associated with severe lower
respiratory tract illness’ [41]. HCoV-HKU1 is a novel
group 2 coronavirus associated with pneumonia
recently isolated from two cases in Hong Kong,
although its population prevalence has yet to be
documented. While this issue remains a potential
consideration and various reports have thus far failed
to provide conclusive empirical evidence either for
[42–44] or against [37] the idea, it is nonetheless
important when considering the extent of seroconver-
sion in the population and the laboratory methods
employed to reduce this potential bias to a minimum.
SARS-CoV is neither a host-range mutant of a known
coronavirus nor a recombinant between known coro-
naviruses but a distinct virus probably with a distant
common ancestor to the group 2 bovine and murine
coronaviruses [45, 46]. The close similarity between
the SARS-CoV open reading frame (ORF) 1b and
other coronaviruses [47, 48] as well as the fact that the
nucleocapsid or N protein shares common antigenic
epitopes with that of antigenic group 1 animal cor-
onaviruses [43] reinforces the need for a cautionary
approach in interpreting laboratory results [49–51]. In
further support of this, 22 samples out of 33 ELISA-
screen positives in the study by Woo et al. [5] reacted
against the N protein but turned out to be negative
when tested against the spike (S) protein [37]. Indeed,
Woo and co-workers [44] recently showed that four
out of 31 HCoV-OC43 and OC-229E samples cross-
reacted on SARS-CoV ELISA testing. Although none
of these four samples were found to contain a speciﬁc
antibody in the recombinant SARS-CoV spike poly-
peptide-based Western blot assay, the gold standard
to avoid this potential pitfall of cross-reactivity in
SARS-CoV antibody detection probably remains the
neutralization assay as the ﬁnal conﬁrmation in the
serial testing protocol.
Our ﬁndings support the global consensus, from
previously available clinical data, that there were
very few, if any, conﬁrmed cases of transmission
from asymptomatic individuals. It remains possible,
although unlikely given the results of published
studies reviewed here [4, 10, 15, 16], that the pattern of
infection is diﬀerent in some children and adolescents.
Nevertheless, results from an as yet unpublished sero-
survey in children from the Amoy Gardens cluster
(the largest superspreading event in Hong Kong) may
yield new information on this issue.
For population-based studies of communicable
disease transmission to provide valid and reliable
results we have demonstrated that it is essential that
standardized protocols and methods are used to
obtain and investigate the sampled subjects. Such an
approach would lead to a more rapid development
of the evidence base needed to inform public health
decision-making in communicable disease control.
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